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RESEARCH NOTES AND COMMENTARIES
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This paper investigates the effect of foreign ownership on strategic investments in Japanese cor-
porations. Foreign owners are typically portfolio investors who frequently buy and sell shares
and hold diversified portfolios of small stakes in many firms. Prior research has presented two
conflicting perspectives on the role of such investors: (a) their frequent trading leads to pressure
for short-term returns that fosters underinvestment; (b) their active trading fosters appropriate
investments. We investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and strategic invest-
ments using dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of 146 Japanese manufacturing firms from
1991 to 1997. We found that foreign ownership enhances strategic investments (in R&D and cap-
ital intensity) to a greater extent when firms have growth opportunities than when they lack such
opportunities. We conclude that foreign ownership fosters appropriate investment. Copyright 
2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The 1990s marked a steep rise in global portfo-
lio ownership, wherein foreign owners, typically
institutional investors from the United States and
United Kingdom invested in equities all over the
world (Useem, 1998). Foreign portfolio investors
usually have a large asset base, hold diversified
portfolios of small stakes in many firms, and
frequently buy and sell shares (Davis and Steil,
2001). Ownership structure has implications for
long-term strategic investments that are needed to
build competencies and exploit growth opportuni-
ties to maximize long-term profitability (Kochhar
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and David, 1995). Prior research has presented
two conflicting perspectives on the role of such
investors: (a) their frequent trading leads to pres-
sure for short-term returns that fosters underin-
vestment (Porter, 1992); (b) their active trading
fosters appropriate investments (Allen, 1993). We
test these competing perspectives by examining the
effect of foreign ownership on two types of strate-
gic investments—R&D and capital intensity—in
Japanese corporations.
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN JAPANESE
CORPORATIONS
Lee and O’Neill (2003) provide an overview of
ownership structures and their effects on R&D
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investments in Japanese corporations. About half
the equity stakes of Japanese corporations is held
by stable domestic owners such as banks, insur-
ance companies, and other corporations, often
reciprocally. Stable owners do not frequently buy
and sell shares for short-term gains, but implic-
itly commit to hold a majority of their shares long
term. Many Japanese corporations are organized
into business groups termed keiretsus, with a main
bank which is both a major lender and owner.
The web of long-term relationships between stable
owners, main banks, and keiretsu partners provides
monitoring while protecting managers from hos-
tile takeover. Lee and O’Neill (2003) conclude that
large block owners foster appropriate R&D invest-
ment. Their study, however, was confined to large
block domestic owners, leaving the effects of for-
eign owners unexplored.
Globalization of equity ownership by institu-
tional investors in the United States and United
Kingdom, economic liberalization easing restric-
tions on foreign ownership of Japanese equities,
and cheaper equity prices fueled a surge in for-
eign ownership in Japanese corporations (Nitta,
2000) from 5 percent in 1990 to over 13 percent
in 1997 (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2002). Although
their aggregate ownership is high, foreign own-
ers typically hold small blocks of shares. Out of a
total of 2376 firms listed in the Nikkei Corporate
Data Book in 1997, foreign owners were listed
as major shareholders in only 36 firms. Aggre-
gate ownership (Association of Japanese Stock
Exchanges, 2002) and trading data (Tokyo Stock
Exchange, 2002) for 1997 indicate that foreign
owners held 13 percent of shares by market value
but accounted for 23 percent of stock transac-
tions; in contrast, stable owners such as corpo-
rations and insurance companies held 25 and 14
percent of equity, but accounted for just 3 and
2 percent of stock transactions, respectively. These
data support the view that foreign investors own
relatively small stakes and trade their shares fre-
quently (Davis and Steil, 2001). For foreign own-
ers, ownership of small stakes in multiple compa-
nies across the world reduces risk through diversi-
fication, and provides liquidity, i.e., the ability to
easily exit their holdings (Tesar and Werner, 1992).
In Japanese corporations, foreign investors tend
to be predominantly institutional investors from
the United States and United Kingdom; in 1997
investors from the United States and United King-
dom held 32 percent and 39 percent of total foreign
shares respectively (Bank of Japan, 2004). Foreign
owners are profit-driven market investors and lack
the close ties with firms enjoyed by stable domestic
owners (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Charkham,
1994).
Prior research on the effects of portfolio own-
ers on strategic investments has generally studied
institutional investors in the United States. Empir-
ical studies find that aggregate institutional owner-
ship is positively associated with R&D (Baysinger,
Kosnik, and Turk, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Wahal and
McConnell, 2000) but ownership by investment
funds that trade more frequently is negatively asso-
ciated both with R&D (Bushee, 1998; Hoskisson
et al., 2002), and corporate entrepreneurship
(Zahra, 1996). In the United States, institutional
investors can exert pressure through activism and
by selling off their shares. Mass sell-offs can nega-
tively impact stock prices, raise the cost of capital,
and enhance the likelihood of a hostile takeover
(Porter, 1992). Parrino, Sias, and Stark (2003)
provide direct evidence that sell-offs by investors
has adverse consequences for managers includ-
ing dismissal, as boards of directors act to retain
investors.
Foreign portfolio owners in Japan share invest-
ment characteristics similar to the U.S. institutional
investors studied in prior research: they have high
aggregate ownership but low individual stakes and
trade frequently. A first step is to understand the
multiple ways in which foreign owners can affect
the decisions and actions of Japanese corpora-
tions. In Japan, unlike the United States, hostile
takeovers are rare because of a variety of social
and institutional constraints (Hoshi and Kashyap,
2001). Nevertheless, the threat of sell-offs by for-
eign owners can provide influence.
First, failure to satisfy foreign owners can in-
crease the cost of capital. Ownership signals infor-
mation about the level of information asymme-
try and managerial opportunism, both of which
affect the default risk and cost of debt capital
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). Their high fre-
quency of trading increases stock liquidity, thus
helping to reduce information asymmetry and the
cost of capital (Brennan and Tamarowski, 2000).
Their presence indicates confidence that the firm
is well managed, while sell-offs can signal the
possibility of managerial opportunism and poor
management, thus increasing the likely threat of
default and raising the cost of debt capital. Prior
research has shown that ownership by institutional
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owners reduces the cost of debt capital in U.S.
corporations (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). Simi-
larly, market liberalization to ease restrictions on
foreign purchase of equities in emerging mar-
kets leads to lower cost of capital (Henry, 2000).
Appeasing foreign owners is important in rais-
ing new capital because a major source of new
funding is bond issues, especially from foreign
sources (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). Thus, failure
to retain foreign owners may result in an increased
cost of capital and constrain managerial discre-
tion.
Second, during the economic downturn in the
1990s, foreign owners helped buy shares from
stable domestic owners that needed to exit their
holdings (Dvorak et al., 2001). After decades of
economic prosperity, the economic bubble burst
in 1991, and the ensuing collapse of stock and
land prices ushered a long period of economic
stagnation and low annual growth rates of only
1.7 percent between 1992 and 1997 (Economic
and Social Research Institute, 2002). Low eco-
nomic growth reduced business opportunities, hurt
stock and land prices, and ultimately the procliv-
ity of stable owners to maintain their long-term
stakes (Dvorak et al., 2001). Several stable domes-
tic owners were compelled to reduce their share-
holdings in affiliated firms so that cash from stock
sales could be used to offset losses. During the eco-
nomic downturn, ownership by corporations and
insurance companies dropped from 46 percent in
1990 to 39 percent in 1997 and foreign owners
stepped in to fill the breech, increasing their own-
ership from 5 percent to 13 percent from 1990 to
1997, thus helping stable domestic owners to cash
out (Association of Japanese Stock Exchanges,
2002).
Finally, failure to retain foreign owners may
affect managerial incentives. As a majority of
shares are held by stable owners who seldom trade
their shares, the active trading by foreign owners
can significantly affect stock price despite their
relatively small holdings. Foreign owners often
demonstrate herding behavior (Kamesaka, Nof-
singer, and Kawakita, 2002) and dissatisfaction
with individual firms can have a snowballing effect
that causes significant drops in stock prices in indi-
vidual firms. Although the absence of a market
for corporate control protects managers from the
threat of takeover, research has shown that man-
agers in Japanese corporations are just as likely as
U.S. managers to get pay cuts or lose their jobs on
account of poor stock performance (Kaplan, 1994).
Managers are therefore likely to be responsive to
foreign owners in order to maintain share prices
and avoid pay cuts and job loss.
These arguments suggest that managers in
Japanese corporations need to be responsive to
foreign owners. Japanese firms have, in fact,
stepped up investor relations efforts to attract for-
eign investors (Yoshikawa and Gedajlovic, 2002).
Empirical research also provides some evidence
that foreign owners do matter and affect corporate
outcomes such as firm performance (Yoshikawa
and Phan, 2003), layoffs (Ahmadjian and Robin-
son, 2001), and wages (Yoshikawa, Phan, and
David, 2005). We argue that share ownership and
trading by foreign owners (in the stock market)
affect resource allocation in strategic investments
(in the firm) and present two conflicting views on
the effect of foreign owners on strategic invest-
ments.
Foreign owners foster underinvestment
Porter (1992) argues that frequent trading by port-
folio investors imposes pressure for short-term
returns and causes underinvestment in long-term
strategic investments, leading to lower firm value.
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) explain that
portfolio investors benefit primarily from near-
term changes in stock price and therefore trade on
information that is likely to be quickly reflected
in the stock price. The presence of multiple for-
eign owners seeking short-term returns can cause
herding on short-term indicators that are unrelated
to long-term economic fundamentals, pressuring
managers to pay undue attention to short-term indi-
cators in a bid to retain foreign ownership. For
example, foreign owners may rush to sell if short-
term earnings shortfalls are interpreted as indica-
tive of potential problems. Managers are therefore
pressured to cut back on strategic investments in
order to pump up earnings so that investor con-
cerns can be alleviated (Stein, 1989).
The potential for strategic investments to en-
hance value is higher when firms have growth
opportunities than when they lack such opportuni-
ties. Thus, reduction in investment is more likely
to be detrimental and constitute underinvestment
when firms have growth opportunities than when
they lack growth opportunities. Accordingly, for-
eign owners are likely to foster underinvestment
when they reduce strategic investment to a greater
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extent in firms with growth opportunities than in
firms lacking growth opportunities.
Foreign owners foster appropriate investments
Allen (1993) develops a competing perspective,
arguing that frequent trading by small block for-
eign owners, far from fostering underinvestment,
may actually facilitate appropriate resource allo-
cation. Allen argues that companies operating in
today’s hypercompetitive technological landscape
with rapid technological change face uncertainty
about the nature and level of appropriate strategic
investments. All of the knowledge needed to make
optimal resource allocations is not available to
managers but is dispersed in the economy (Hayek,
1945). Accordingly, input from multiple parties is
likely to be helpful in determining the appropri-
ate level of long-term investments. Ownership by
a large base of foreign portfolio investors provides
multiple owners with the incentive to monitor man-
agers (Allen, 1993).
Although managers have more information than
any single investor, the stock market as a whole
can provide a superior mechanism for aggregat-
ing the dispersed knowledge needed for resource
allocation (Grossman, 1995). The stock market
provides incentives to investors to acquire knowl-
edge, and by acting on the knowledge acquired,
to disseminate it to other market participants. The
stock prices of firms will come to reflect this aggre-
gated consensus of knowledge and firms that fail
to use this information in their investment deci-
sions are likely to see their stock values decline.
According to Dow and Gorton (1997), stock trad-
ing can have both a ‘retrospective’ and a ‘prospec-
tive’ role. The prospective role of the stock market
arises because of the aggregation of information
that permits stock prices to provide knowledge on
appropriate resource allocation. The retrospective
role arises from the ability of stock trading to influ-
ence managers. If managers fail to respond to the
signals sent through trading behavior, foreign own-
ers can sell off their shares, and if managers want
to retain foreign owners, they are likely to make
appropriate strategic investments. We have noted
that the potential for value enhancement from addi-
tional investment is higher when firms have growth
opportunities than when they lack such opportu-
nities. Accordingly, foreign owners are likely to
foster appropriate investment when they enhance
strategic investments to a greater extent in firms
with growth opportunities than in firms lacking
growth opportunities.
Competing hypotheses on strategic investments
Prior research provides ambiguous guidance about
interpreting direct associations between ownership
and strategic investment. Some studies assume
that additional investments are invariably desir-
able: positive associations between ownership and
investment are interpreted as evidence of appro-
priate investment, while negative associations are
interpreted as underinvestment (Baysinger et al.,
1991; Bushee, 1998; Graves, 1988; Wahal and
McConnell, 2000). By contrast, studies using a
restructuring perspective assert that agency prob-
lems can lead to overinvestment by managers that
can be checked by vigilant owners through restruc-
turing: a negative association between ownership
and investment is viewed as appropriate foster-
ing of restructuring, while positive associations are
viewed unfavorably as fostering overinvestment
(Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). Interpreting direct
associations between ownership and investment
presents a serious challenge because the impli-
cation of direct associations depends on assump-
tions as to whether or not additional investments
are desirable. In practice, additional investment is
not always desirable, but is appropriate only when
firms have the potential to benefit from such invest-
ment; determining whether additional investment
represents appropriate investment requires a means
to identify the desirability of additional investment.
Tobin (1969) proposed the ratio of market value
of capital to replacement value, termed Q, as a
measure of the desirability of additional invest-
ment. Additional capital investments are desirable
when market value exceeds the replacement cost
of capital (Q > 1) because this indicates the avail-
ability of external opportunities wherein internal
capabilities can be leveraged such that investments
generate greater returns than their cost. When Q
exceeds 1, each additional dollar of capital invest-
ment has the potential to raise market value by
more than a dollar. Additional strategic invest-
ments are appropriate because the market value
created from such investments is likely to exceed
their cost. Conversely, when Q is less than 1,
each additional dollar invested is likely to yield
less than a dollar in market value, and additional
investments become undesirable. Thus, benefits
from additional strategic investments are likely to
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be greater for firms that have growth opportu-
nity (Q > 1) than for those that lack them (Q ≤
1).
The Q measure of growth opportunities has sev-
eral advantages. First, it is an ex ante measure
derived from forward-looking stock market expec-
tations about the future, rather than an ex post
measure of past growth. Second, it gauges growth
opportunities for the firm by combining both exter-
nal factors such as industry attractiveness, and
internal capabilities by which these external oppor-
tunities can be exploited. Finally, Q has been
used as a measure of growth opportunities in prior
governance research (David, Hitt, and Gimeno,
2001; Lang, Ofek, and Stulz, 1996). In these stud-
ies, the use of Q as a moderating variable helps
avoid the pitfalls arising from examining direct
effects between ownership and investment. For
example, David et al. (2001) show that investor
activism results in increased R&D in high-Q
firms and conclude that activist institutions facil-
itate appropriate investment by increasing R&D
when such investments are desirable. Similarly,
Lang et al. (1996) find that debt reduces capi-
tal investments in low-Q firms and conclude that
debt facilitates appropriate investment by reduc-
ing capital investment when they are not desir-
able.
We adopt a similar approach. Strategic invest-
ments are more beneficial when firms have the
potential to benefit from such investment, i.e.,
when firms have growth opportunities than when
growth opportunities are unavailable. Accordingly,
appropriate investment implies higher strategic
investments when firms have growth opportunities
than when they lack growth opportunities, while
underinvestment implies lower strategic invest-
ment when firms have growth opportunities than
when firms lack growth opportunities. If foreign
owners foster appropriate investment, then they
should encourage strategic investments to a greater
extent when growth opportunities are present than
when growth opportunities are absent. Conversely,
if foreign owners foster underinvestment, they
should reduce strategic investments to a greater
extent when growth opportunities are present than
when growth opportunities are absent.
Hypothesis 1. Foreign ownership is more neg-
atively associated with strategic investments in
the presence of growth opportunities than in
their absence (underinvestment).
Hypothesis 2. Foreign ownership is more pos-
itively associated with strategic investments in
the presence of growth opportunities than in
their absence (appropriate investment).
Sample
The sample was chosen from the 200 largest indus-
trial firms in Japan measured by sales in 1987.
Several firms were dropped as they did not meet
various criteria established for inclusion: four were
privately held, 19 were not listed for part of the
period studied, 12 changed their fiscal year-ends
during the sampling period and therefore did not
consistently report annual financial data over time,
three were not listed in sources that provided data
on some of the variables, one was in the quasi-
government sector, and eight were outside the
manufacturing sector that is the focus of our study.
Also, as our theory is developed for small block
portfolio owners, we carefully screened the names
of major shareholders indicated in the Japan Com-
pany Handbook and eliminated eight firms with
large block strategic foreign owners. Finally, we
were left with 146 firms observed over 7 years
from 1991 to 1997.
Variables
The dependent variable, strategic investments, was
computed as R&D intensity (R&D expense to
sales) and capital intensity (capital expense to
sales). Foreign ownership, the independent vari-
able, is the percent shares held by foreign investors
obtained from the Japan Company Handbook.
Growth opportunity is a dummy variable with
value 1 when Q exceeds 1 and 0 otherwise. Q is
computed as the ratio of market value (sum of mar-
ket value of equity, book value of preferred stock,
and book value of debt) to total assets (Chung
and Pruitt, 1994). Several control variables that
affect strategic investments were also included:
cash flow (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson, 1988),
major domestic owners (Lee and O’Neill, 2003),
return on assets (Hundley, Jacobson, and Park,
1996), debt to total assets (Lang et al., 1996), and
firm size. Cash flow is computed as sales less
cost of goods sold, selling, general, and admin-
istrative expenditure, taxes, interest, and dividend
paid as a ratio of total assets (Fazzari et al., 1988).
Firm size was computed as log of sales. Major
domestic ownership was the proportion of shares
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held by major Japanese financial and nonfinancial
companies obtained from the Japan Company
Handbook (Lee and O’Neill, 2003). All financial
data were obtained from Worldscope.
Analysis
The Arellano–Bond method, a statistical technique
designed for analyzing autoregressive-distributed
lag models from panels with many cross-sectional
units observed for relatively few time periods
via General Method of Moments (GMM) esti-
mates, has several advantages (Arellano, 2003).
First, it controls for lagged values of the depen-
dent variable as strategic investments are likely
influenced by prior levels. Second, panel data anal-
ysis accounts for fixed effects from firm-specific
heterogeneity that is constant over time, aris-
ing, for example, from differences in firm-specific
investment practices. Unobserved firm-specific
heterogeneity is eliminated by first-differencing, or
subtracting the lagged values of regressors. Third,
endogeneity issues that arise when explanatory
variables are correlated with an error term are eas-
ily addressed by using lagged values of the regres-
sors as instruments of the first-differenced regres-
sors. Finally, GMM estimation provides improved
estimates in the presence of the unknown het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation that often arise
in dynamic panels.
Results
Summary statistics and tests of the competing
hypotheses are reported in Tables 1 and 2, respec-
tively. The positive and statistically significant
interaction effect of foreign ownership with growth
opportunities on R&D and capital intensity indi-
cates that foreign owners foster strategic invest-
ments to a greater extent when firms have growth
opportunities than when firms lack growth oppor-
tunities. This result is consistent with Allen’s view
that foreign ownership fosters appropriate invest-
ment and counter to Porter’s view that foreign
ownership fosters underinvestment. We also plot
separate regression equations for the two con-
texts—availability of growth opportunities and
absence of such opportunities—in Figure 1 to pro-
vide a visual illustration of the effect of foreign
ownership.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We studied the effect of foreign ownership on
strategic investments in Japanese corporations by
developing and testing two competing perspec-
tives. We found that foreign ownership is more
positively associated with strategic investments for
firms with growth opportunities than those lack-
ing such opportunities. The relationship is robust
across both types of strategic investments studied:
R&D and capital intensity. Our results run counter
to concerns expressed by some scholars (Porter,
1992) that owners that trade frequently pressure
firms to underinvest by cutting back on strate-
gic investments when they are desirable. On the
contrary, our results support the view that foreign
owners can foster appropriate strategic investments
by increasing strategic investments when they are
desirable (Allen, 1993).
Governance research tends to focus on the role
of stable, large block owners that can monitor
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 R&D intensity 3.46 2.30 0.02
2 Capital intensity 7.38 5.50 0.02
3 Industry R&D intensity 3.12 1.29 0.63 0.01
4 Industry capital intensity 6.84 3.09 −0.01 0.56 0.04
5 Cash flow 0.04 0.04 0.31 0.10 0.27 −0.08
6 Debt to total assets 0.34 0.16 −0.23 −0.10 −0.11 −0.06 −0.25
7 Log of sales 13.29 0.87 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.07
8 ROA 2.89 2.09 0.08 0.37 −0.01 0.37 0.44 −0.30 −0.03
9 Major domestic ownership 36.82 11.54 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 −0.16 −0.13 −0.32 −0.07
10 Foreign ownership 7.60 5.99 0.25 −0.05 0.23 −0.30 0.51 −0.30 0.20 0.16 −0.33
11 Tobin Q dummy 0.51 0.50 0.01 0.18 −0.07 0.17 0.18 −0.09 −0.23 0.36 −0.06 0.05
N = 1022 firm years (146 firms × 7 years, balanced panel)
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Table 2. Results of panel data analysis of strategic investments
Model 2
R&D intensity
Model 4
Capital intensity
R&D intensity 0.16∗∗∗
Capital intensity 0.12∗∗∗
Industry R&D intensity 0.65∗∗∗
Industry Capital intensity 0.91∗∗∗
Cash flow −1.55∗∗∗ −2.86
Debt to total assets 0.37∗∗ 10.21∗∗∗
Log of sales −0.48∗∗∗ 7.53∗∗∗
ROA −0.02∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
Major domestic ownership −0.01∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
Foreign ownership −0.01∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗
Tobin Q dummy −0.11∗∗∗ −0.09
Foreign ownership × Tobin Q dummy 0.01∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Wald χ 2 2781.31 1016.65
N = 1022 firm years (146 firms × 7 years, balanced panel)
∗ p < 0.050; ∗∗ p < 0.010; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
and gain direct influence in overseeing managers
through ‘voice’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). We
find that foreign owners that hold diversified port-
folios of small stakes in many firms and frequently
buy and sell shares (‘exit’) can also have an impor-
tant role in resource allocation. This result is con-
sistent with a stream of macroeconomics research
that has shown that factors that smooth the func-
tioning of capital markets such as stock market
liquidity that facilitate easy exit can lead to effi-
cient resource allocation (see Levine, 1997, for a
review). More research is needed to understand
the role of ‘exit’ i.e., frequent buying and selling
of shares by foreign owners, in releasing infor-
mation, providing monitoring and their effects on
resource allocation in strategic investments within
firms.
R&D investments are likely to be more benefi-
cial when firms have growth opportunities imply-
ing a positive association. Surprisingly, we found
a negative association between growth opportuni-
ties and R&D investments, indicating that firms
with growth opportunities have lower R&D invest-
ments than those that lack such opportunities. We
infer that Japanese firms lacking growth opportu-
nities may have overinvested in R&D. Although
surprising, this result is consistent with consid-
erable prior research on Japanese corporations.
Japanese managers are aggressive in their strategic
investments (Lazonick, 2002). Their stakehold-
ers—stable owners and main banks—encourage a
long-term perspective (Yoshikawa et al., 2005) to
the extent of fostering overinvestment (Henderson
and Cool, 2003). They tend to value growth over
profit (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985) and weight
long-term returns more heavily in making strate-
gic investments (Poterba and Summers, 1995).
Japanese firms react to underperformance by
increasing R&D (Hundley et al., 1996), and per-
sist in investing even when growth opportuni-
ties are lacking (Thomas and Waring, 1999). The
prosperity of Japanese corporations during the
1980s provided them considerable free cash, as
well as easy access to cheap debt financing, that
has the potential to exacerbate overinvestment
(Kester, 1991). Interestingly, the negative associa-
tion between Tobin’s Q and R&D is not unique to
our study; similar results are reported by Lu and
Beamish (2004). More research is needed to study
the strategic and governance aspects of possible
overinvestment in Japanese corporations.
Interpreting direct effects of ownership on strate-
gic investments (Baysinger et al., 1991; Wahal
and McConnell, 2000) depends on assumptions as
to whether strategic investments are desirable. If
Japanese firms have overinvested in R&D (as indi-
cated by the negative association between growth
opportunities and R&D), the negative associa-
tion between foreign ownership and R&D sug-
gests that foreign owners may be fostering cut-
backs to align R&D investments with the firm’s
growth opportunities. This result is consistent with
recent findings that foreign owners reduce strategic
investments in human capital by reducing wages
(Yoshikawa et al., 2005) and employees (Ahmad-
jian and Robinson, 2001). More research is needed
Copyright  2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 591–600 (2006)
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Figure 1. Relationship between strategic investment and foreign ownership
to evaluate if foreign owners can play a useful role
in restructuring overinvestment in Japanese corpo-
rations.
In our study, we emphasize interaction effects—
not main effects. Figure 1 illustrates that for-
eign ownership is positively associated with R&D
investment when growth opportunities are avail-
able, and is negatively associated with R&D invest-
ment when growth opportunities are unavailable.
It appears that foreign owners foster appropri-
ate investment, enhancing R&D investments when
growth opportunities enhance the likely benefits,
and reducing R&D investments when the lack of
growth opportunities threatens to limit the likely
benefits. Interestingly, the pattern for capital inten-
sity is somewhat different. We find, consistent
with our hypotheses, that capital intensity is higher
when growth opportunities are available than when
they are absent. Nevertheless, the main effect of
foreign ownership is to reduce capital intensity,
presumably as a means to curtail overinvestment.
Most of the prior research examining Porter’s view
has focused on R&D intensity; more research is
needed to understand capital investments.
Recent ownership trends suggest that foreign
owners are gaining importance all over the world
(Useem, 1998). Our research suggests that these
small block foreign owners have important impli-
cations for strategic investments by firms. This in
turn has implications for global competitiveness
and firm performance. Related research by
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) finds that for-
eign ownership spurs adoption of global gover-
nance codes in a study of 49 countries, leading
to increased convergence across national borders.
More research on foreign ownership worldwide is
likely to help us better understand ownership struc-
tures and their effects on governance, strategy, and
performance.
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